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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RULON R. WEST,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

TERRY R. WEST and FLORA E.
WEST,

Case No.
10251

Defendants, Respondents,
and Cross-Appellants.

RESPONDENTS' AND
CROSS ..APPELLANT'S BRIEF
---0--For the convenience of the Court the texts of
the agreements are annexed to this brief as
appendices "A" for the Articles of Partnership
"B" for the Dissolution Agreement and "C" for
the Supplemental Agreement. The documents
are referred to in the brief however by the Exhibit numbers affixed at trial.

---0--STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE

Respondents adopt Appellant's statement under this
heading but enlarge it to correctly show this court directed
the trial court to determine the intent of the parties when
they executed all agreements: Articles of Partnership,
(Ex. 1) Dissolution Agreement, (Exs. 2 and 15) and a
Supplemental Agreement (Ex. 16) .
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The chief question to be answered upon appeal is
as it has always been, were the payments made by Rulo~
into the partnership made as loans or as contributions to
Capital?

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Respondents adopt Appellant's characterization of
the disposition below.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmation of the judgment
except as to the following points raised on cross-appeal:
1. The finding and judgment that the amounts paid
into the partnership by Rulon after December 3, 1958,
were not contributions to capital and should be repaid
him prior to distribution on the 40, 40, and 20 per cent
basis should be reversed as set forth in detail under
Respondents' Argument VII herein.
2. The finding and judgment that interest on a
partner's capital account not paid in a given year should
be credited to a liability account of the partnership,
payable to the partner, and should not be credited to
his capital account is not supported by the evidence, is
offensive to generally accepted accounting practices and
procedure, is erroneous as a matter of law, and should be
reversed as set forth in detail under VIII in the argument
herein.
3. The court's finding and judgment that in the
calculation of "gross profits" salaries to partners should
not be deducted from gross sales or income is not supported by the evidence and is erroneous as a matter of
law, and should be reversed as set forth in Argument IX
herein.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
While the \vriter conducted the trial of the case for
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respondent's before Judge Jeppson, it is his first appearance in the case on appeal.
The various statements of fact heretofore presented
to the court by the parties in the two appeals are exhaustive and little would be served to chronicle them
anew. However, the writer believes that to bring the case
into proper perspective some fuller mention must be
made of the events attendant upon the dissolution of the
partnership in March 1960, because the acts of the parties
at that time would be definitively determinative of their
intent at all stages of their relationship.
After approximately two and one half years of the
running of the partnership Rulon caused his counsel to
send Terry a letter on March 21 , 1960 (Ex. 8) notifying
Terry of Rulon's withdrawal from the partnership and
advising Terry this worked a dissolution under Utah
statutes.
The letter referred to paragraphs 12 and 6 of the
Articles and stated that after the winding up the assets
should be distributed, and 40 per cent was to be distributed to Rulon.
In the ten days following the letter, Mr. Earl M.
Wunderli, Rulon's then counsel, Mr. E. L. Schoenhals,
Terry's and Flora's then counsel, and Terry and Rulon
themselves had conversations looking to an orderly winding up of the business. These conversations eventuated in
the draft by Wunderli of the Dissolution Agreement
(Exs. 2 and 15). Rulon, Terry, Wunderli, and Schoenhals
met in Murray, Utah, on or about April 2 to discuss the
winding up and to execute the agreement. Flora was not
present, it being the apparent intention of the others that
her presence was not required.
All parties seemed friendly and amiable at this
juncture, although the dissolution itself had grown out of
dissatisfaction with the results of the partnership venture.
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All persons at the meeting knew the following:
1. That Rulon had put approximately $150 000
into the partnership.
'
2. That the total value of the business was now
something less than $150,000.
3. That if Rulon had his entire contribution returned to him, there would be nothing left to divide 40%,
40%, and 20%.
Earlier, and during the running of the partnership
venture, Rulon had discussed estate planning with his
attorneys Wunderli and Holdsworth in Terry's presence.
(R. 141-142). At the meeting in Murray, additional
discussion was had with respect to the tax consequence
of Terry and Flora receiving the substantial interests they
were to receive from the partnership upon dissolution.
These considerations revolved around the possible income
tax liability which Flora and Terry might bear as opposed
to the more favorable treatment of the situation if the
transfer of these interests were effected by gift from
Rulon to Terry and Flora and the resulting lower tax
burden of the gift tax rates. ( R. 334-342). Both counsel
and the parties apparently agreed that the overall effect
of the operation of the Articles of Partnership and the
Dissolution Agreement was that a gift of some 60% of
Rulon's contributions had been made to Terry and
Flora. As a consequence of this, Exhibit 16, an agreement
designated as supplemental to the Dissolution Agreement,
was struck. This supplemental agreement was drawn
under a time pressure, because Rulon was departing on
a trip momentarily (R. 338) and because of the time
pressure it undoubtedly lacks art. However, it expressed
over Rulon's and Terry's signature that the amounts
Terry and Flora were to receive were by way of gift, and
Rulon, to implement this concept, agreed to forthwith
execute and file gift tax returns. (Ex. 16)
Summaries of relevant testimony and the contents
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of the various exhibits will be set forth in more detail in
connection with the arguments hereafter.
ARGUMENT
I

THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AS TO
THE INTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES AS REPRESENTED IN THE ARTICLES OF PARTNERSHIP, THE DISSOLUTION AGREEMENT, AND
THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT ARE FULLY
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
There are two classic concepts that bear on all points
to be argued herein:
FIRST: That the trial court having the parties
before him in the flesh is in a better position than a
reviewing court to evaluate credibility and determine
ultimate fact, particularly to the extent that these evaluations depend upon those subtle human actions and reactions which are present in the trial but are strangely
missing from the printed record. Moreover, the trial,
however long, is stamped in the judge's mind as a cohesive unit rather than a disjointed series of subjects and
events as it appears in the record and in briefs. Growing
out of this venerable concept is the
SECOND: that the reviewing court will not reverse
the findings of the trial court in the presence of substantial evidence on which the trial court's findings are
based.
When this court remanded for the trial court to
take evidence as to the intent of the parties when they
executed the three agreements, it stated that in this connection "it is proper to consider the background and
circumstances, including the relationship of the parties,
the purposes for which the documents were made, and
principles of equity and justice relating thereto."
Appellant assails the findings because, inter alia, the
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court failed to find with respect to "actual intent." Intent
is subjective. An objective trier of fact cannot, of course,
look into a man's mind to determine intent. He infers
from the person's words and acts what the intent is.
Rulon is heard in court attempting to repudiate an
intent once clearly expressed in conversations and in
documents which he caused to be formulated. The court
was obviously unimpressed with Rulon's current claim
that his payments into the partnership were all loans,
\vhen his words and acts, and particularly those reduced
to writing, were eloquent of the intent to commit his
contributions irrevocably to the fortunes of the partnership, including the sharing of these contributions on a
40-40-20 per cent basis with his son and wife upon dissolution.
Taking the findings one by one, the evidence regarding intent reveals the following:

FINDING NO. 2 (R. 65)
The finding is that the intent of all the parties was
that the $47,500 equity in the real estate contract together with $1,000 in a bank account were capital contributions by Rulon and did not constitute a loan to the
partnership. This intent was expressed at paragraph 3(a)
of the Articles. (Emphasis added)
Paragraph 3 (a) states in unambiguous wording that
"the capital of the partnership shall consist of the following property:" (a) designates the $48,500, and (b)
" . A.ny further sums which any partner shall with the consent of the others from time to time contribute for capital
purposes "'rhich shall be credited to his capital account."
It is undisputed that Rulon contributed an additional $100,000, that it was consented to by Flora and
Terry, that it was used for capital purposes and, until
dissolution, was credited to Rulon's capital account.
In connection with intent at the inception of the
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partnership the witnesses testified regarding the original
$48,500 and the subsequent monies to be committed to
the venture as follows :
Mr. Roberts, the scrivener, said he had handled the
real estate contract, that Rulon asked him to designate
the buyers thereunder as Rulon and Terry. Roberts asked
if Rulon wanted a designation of himself and Terry as
tenants in common or joint tenants, and Rulon replied
"It doesn't make much difference, because we are going
to turn it over to a partnership immediately." The same
day, Rulon asked Roberts to prepare an assignment of
the Mortensen contract to a partnership known as "El
Rancho Enterprises." (R. 92-93)
Rulon did not then designate his contributions as
loans rather than capital, his chief concern being receiving interest on the money. He testified :
Q: So, in fact you and Terry agreed that interest
was to be paid on the capital accounts, did you not?
A: If you wish to call it capital. I don't know
where you can put it. I am not a bookkeeper. I am not
an accountant. All I knew (know) is that I had $150,000,
approximately, in there, and I was expecting to get 5%
interest on my money, whether you name it "capital" or
whether you name it something else." (R. 163)
When asked why he didn't insist that Roberts identify his contributions as "loans" he stated he was expecting fairness from Terry and when challenged on this
he replied:
Q: Do you here today assert Terry West got
Paul Roberts to change the wording from what you
wanted it to be?
(Objection entered)
A: No, I'm not alluding (to) that in any way.
Q: You didn't, in any case, insist that Paul Roberts
write the word "loan" in there, did you?
A: No, I didn't. (R. 164)
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The word "loan" doesn't appear in the Articles in
connection with partners' contributions.
Moreover, when Mr. Roe was attempting to lead
Rulon into a statement that he discussed the return of
his money with Terry, he would not be so led:
Q: (Roe) : What I'm trying to find out, Mr.
West, whether, at any time during the advances you and
Terry talked about the method these sums would be
repaid, or whether they would be treated as capital, or
loans, or anything of that kind, that is what (I'm) trying
to find out . . . Was there any discussion of that sort.
A. : No, there was no discussions. * * *
Q: There was no discussion?
A. : No discussion. ( R. 154-S)

Q.:

* * *

. . . At that time now subsequent to that

occasion, were there any discussions between you and
him about that? You understand ~Nhat I mean by "about
that"?
A.: No, I think . . .
Q.: By "about that" I mean whether the sums
you paid over were to be paid back, or whether they
were to be put into capital, or what was to be done
with them?
A.: A few months later, yes.
Q.: Where did this conversation occur, and when,
and who was present, if you remember?
A. : Again, it was out at the motel; and, again,
we were alone, and I told him that I had to have some
interest returned to me on my money.
He told me, as soon as he got the trailer court built
and had it rented, that I would receive 5 per cent on
my money. (R. 155) (Emphasis added)
FLORA was deposed by l\1r. Roe on April14, 1961,
just three months after the lawsuit was filed. He soug~t
therein by leading questions her admission that she dtd
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not intend, originally, to get an interest in Rulon's contributions. Her responses are clearly to the contrary:
Q.: Was it your thought, then, that if you received
some share of the corporation (partnership) that it dated
from that gift you are talking about?
A.: From the beginning . . . from the beginning
... from the beginning of the partnership. (R. 179)
(Emphasis added)
Nor was she uncertain about it being capital, divisible upon dissolution, as opposed to capital or loan
returnable to Rulon en toto :
Q.: (Roe) It was your understanding that, if the
partnership were ever terminated, by whatever means,_
you would get 20 cents of every dollar he (Rulon) put in?
A.: Mister, I have asked you to read that; it
speaks for itself. (Referring to Articles)
Q.: I am just asking you for your understanding.
A: That was my understanding. . . . I figured
these documents were legal. I figured they were legal all
the way through; and when it was said and signed, that
was it. (R. 180-181 ) (Emphasis added)
This is clear reference to original talk and writings.
Terry testified that at the original conversations with
his father prior to forming the partnership they discussed that his father was a wealthy man, that he had
given considerable thought to estate planning and distributing part of his estate to his children ( R. 141-2 ) ;
that if he quit college and forsook a professional career
he wanted some assurance that his father would carry
through with the promise to actually give him an equity
in the business, upon dissolution or a business failure, not
just a nebulous chance to make some profits. (R. 132-3;
320) Terry had lived for much of his life with his
mother when Rulon was away most of the time and
when home was continually quarreling with Flora
over money and financial matters. It is obvious he had
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some concern about his father's arbitrariness. (R. 327329) Terry was agreeable that the total capital contributed by Rulon remain in a capital account in Rulon's
name to draw interest if profits were made until dissolution; (R. 112-113) that at no time did Rulon ever
claim his contributions would be loans:
"During my whoi~ business affairs with my
father, we have never discussed or even mentioned
notes or loans.'' (R. 272, line 24)
That Rulon specifically told him in the first prepartnership meeting that he would not expect the
return of his capital; ( R. 111-112) and that he never
received the letters requesting notes (Exs. 9, 10) Rulon
said he sent to him. (R. 272)
In February 1960, prior to dissolution, Rulon took
Terry to talk with Mr. Wunderli and Mr. Holdsworth,
lawyers in the firm now representing him. Terry testified that Rulon told him at this meeting he wanted Terry
to get most of his part of Rulon's estate through the
partnership. Extensive discussion was had by Rulon,
Terry and Holdsworth at this point, and by clear implication Rulon's intentions on this matter related back
to the inception of the partnership. ( R. 141-143)
Rulon at no time during the trial repudiated this,
nor were Holdsworth and Wunderli produced at trial
to change this impression.
Thus we observe substanital bodies of evidence to
the effect that the parties intended at all times, and
particularly at the inception of the partnership, that the
sums contributed by Rulon initially and to be contributed
thereafter were to be distributed upon dissolution proportionally to the parties 40, 40 and 20, but that prior
to dissolution partners were to receive interest on their
capital accounts as the first step in the distribution of
profits.
FINDING NO. 3, (R. 65) that its was the intent
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of the parties that interest at the rate of 5% per annum
was to paid to partners on their capital accounts out of
gross profits, has been discussed supra. The finding regarding the intent that interest was cumulative and that
it should be credited to a liability account of the partnership payable to the partner earning the interest will be
discussed at argument VIII infra, because respondents
seek a reversal of that part of the finding.
FINDING NO. 4 ( R. 66), that the parties intended that partnership profits should be distributed to,
and losses borne by, the partners in the proportions of
40%, 40%, and 20% to Rulon, Terry and Flora respectively, is apparently not challenged by appellant.
There is of course ample testimony that this was the
intent of the parties. See especially Roberts' testimony
(R. 94), where Rulon and Terry directed Roberts to so
provide.
In the second part of finding No. 4, the court
states "To fulfill the intent of the parties in connection
with items of interest on capital accounts, and of profits
and losses, it is necessary to make the following accounting entries : " Then follows the dollar amount entries
to which counsel stipulated as being correct as to the
court's accounting theory.
The interest amounts set forth as earned on capital
balances in years when profits were made and to be
credited to a liability account of the partnership payable
to partners and not to a capital account, will be challenged at VIII infra, as referred to earlier herein.
FINDING NO. 5. (R. 69) The evidence regarding
the intent of the parties that R.ulon's payments into the
partnership were on account of capital and not by way of
loan has been discussed above. The findings that the payments he made prior to December 3, 1958, totaling
$119,224.00 were used in the business for capital purposes
and credited to his capital account has been demon-
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strated. Rulon never seriously challenged this handling of
the money and when some effort at the trial was made to
assert use of the money for other than capital purposes,
he finally testified that of the total of $150,000 he had
committed to the venture, all but one $60 item and one
$900 item had gone into capital expenditures. (R. 168170)
FINDING NO. 6 (R. 69) that the payments totaling $29,645.39 paid by Rulon after December 3, 1958,
were "not intended to be paid in as contributions to
capital, and were not intended to be distributed to
partners upon dissolution" is challenged by respondents
at VIII infra as being without evidentiary support.
FINDING NO. 7 (R. 70) is a factual statement
of stipulation by the parties that the dissolution date was
March 21, 1960.
FINDING NO. 8 (R. 70). The detailed wording
of this finding is here commended to the Court. In
substance the court found the parties intended:
1. Upon dissolution the business would be wound
up by paying liabilities, including liabilities to partners
not in respect of capital.
2. That, specifically, the phrase "liabilities to partners" used at paragraph 1 of the Dissolution Agreement
was not intended to refer to capital accounts of the
partners.
3. The net assets remaining after payment of liabilities were intended by the parties to then be distributed to Rulon, Terry and Flora 40, 40 and 20.
In this connection the witnesses testified as follows:
TERRY: Testified that the accounting entry he
made subsequent to dissolution transferring the total of
all capital accounts to Rulon, himself and Flora in the
40, 40, 20 proportions was pursuant to an oral a.g:eement with his father prior to the Articles, the provisions
of the Articles themselves, his father's letter of Dissolu-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
tion, the Dissolution Agreement, the Supplemental
Agreement, and oral commitments with his father upon
the occasions of the signing of all documents. (R. 132-3)
That he, his father and attorney Holdsworth discussed, prior to dissolution, that he would receive 40%
of the capital accounts of the business upon dissolution.
(R. 144-5)
That in conversations with his sisters and others of
the family he told them he had the following interests
in the business: $2000-3000 in his capital account, a
$500 monthly salary, and "if and when a dissolution ever
came * * * that at that time I would have 40% of the
capital account of El Rancho Enterprises, pursuant to
an agreement made by myself and my father." (R. 277-8)
His position has been consistent at all times on this
point - that he did not come into 40% of his father's
contribution until dissolution. (R. 278)
He testified he believed that all three documents
embodied this intent and this concept, and particularly
paragraphs 6 and 12 of the Articles as re-stated by
paragraph 1 of the Dissolution Agreement (R. 280,
lines 22 to 30, 282, lines 1 to 3) .
He testified that he never at any time intended to
receive only 40% of what was left after his father had
been repaid his total contribution. ( R. 282)
On the point that "liabilities to partners" did not
include capital he was firm: He testified that at the
Murray meeting with Rulon, Wunderli and Schoenhals,
he specifically discussed the phrase "liabilities to partners" with Rulon and Wunderli.
Q.: Was it your intent the phrase, "liabilities to
partners" included your father's capital account?
A.: Absolutely not.
Q.: Did you have any discussion with your father
at that meeting?
A.: Yes.
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i\.: Did you discuss with him the phrase "liabilities to partners" in the Dissolution Agreement?
A.: Yes.
Q.: State in substance and effect, or if you can
remember, exactly what you said and what he said.
A.: I asked my father, and his attorney, why they
had included "liabilities to partners" in this Dissolution
Agreement they drew up. Mr. Wunderli told me it was
his knowledge that mother had made business loans, and
at the time he drew up that dissolution agreement he
did not know whether those loans had been paid off or
not, and that this encompassed any liability that may
or may not be on the books at the time of the final dissolution. I explained to him at that time there was, as
of that date, April 2, there were no liabilities to partners
upon the books of account. He told me rather than
cross it out, that this may take a long time to wind up,
and between now and actually winding up there could
very possibly be liabilities to partners, such as wages to
even myself. I told him I could see the possibility, and
the phrase did not bother me in the least. (R. 284)
RUTH WEST FRANCIS, Terry's sister and the
daughter of Rulon and Flora, was deposed in her sick
bed at her home in Kaysville, Utah, by Mr. Ronnow
and Mr. Roe on April 13, 1964, two days before .the
trial commenced. She was married, the mother of four,
and the next to oldest of the West children.
She testified that on or about April 2, 1960, she
V\'as at her mother's home in Salt Lake City, and Rulon
told her he had just come from a meeting with Terry
and the attorneys i~ Murray. That he was "happy and
very much relieved"; he said "they had reached a
dissolution of this partnership and that they had reached
a settlement"; that "out of the goodness of his heart
he had given Terry his share in the partnership and
Mother her share"; that the "shares" would be $60,000
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to Terry and $30,000 to Mother; that it would be tax
free; that "this was a portion of their inheritance. It
was a portion of Terry's inheritance and that Terry
would have it now." (R. 209-210)
She testified that in her presence the following
morning Rulon stated to Donna Holmes (another sister)
and Roy Holmes, her husband, substantially the same
thing, including the dollar amounts of $60,000 and
$30,000 which Terry and Flora were getting. (R. 21112)
Neither of the Holmes', produced as friendly witnesses by Rulon, denied Ruth's testimony.
Ruth also testified that Rulon had told her at this
time that he had discussed with Terry the matter of
Terry buying Rulon's portion or share, contra that Terry
was categorically to buy Rulon out as stated by Mr.
Roe in his brief at page 14. (R. 257, lines 19-22) (Emphasis added)
Rulon said no word in the trial to deny this conversation with his daughter or repudiate its effect. He
must be deemed to have agreed that he said these things
and that he did the things that he said. Since the dollar
amounts of $60,000 to Terry and $30,000 to Flora are
40% and 20%, respectively, of the round total of
$150,000 he had contributed to the venture, and since
what he agreed to on April 2nd was fully in keeping
with the wording of the original Articles, he is deemed
to be supporting the contention of respondents that it
was the intent of the parties at all times to distribute all
capital or net assets at dissolution regardless of who had
contributed it.
One brief line from Flora's testimony reflects she
held the view that before dissolution she would get
profits, upon dissolution a percentage of all capital, including Terry's.
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Q.:

It was your understanding that you would be
the owner of 20 per cent of that (Terry's investment)
A. : Of what he put in?

Q.:

Yes.

A.: That all depended. * * * if the thing was
sold, you know what happens. If it isn't sold, I come in
for profits. ( R. 182) (Emphasis added)
MR. E. L. SCHOENHALS called by respondents
and cross-examined at length by appellants testified regarding distribution as follows: That Mr. Wunderli had
prepared the dissolution agreement, had sent it to
Schoenhals signed by Rulon requesting immediate signing by Terry because Rulon was leaving on a trip and
wanted the matter settled before he left, that Schoenhals
and Wunderli agreed that a supplemental agreement
stating that Terry and Flora were getting their shares
by way of gift and Rulon would file a gift tax return
should be prepared to clarify the estate situation; that
Schoenhals prepared it and he and Wunderli rode together to the Murray meeting. (R. 337-9) That at the
meeting Rulon said he wanted to get back 40% of approximately $147,000 he had put in, (R-334-5); that
there was some discussion of Terry's buying out Rulon's
40% but that nothing was done about that (R. 336);
that Wunderli or Rulon discussed the point that by
Terry's receiving the "gift" he would be eliminated from
Rulon's will because he would be getting all he was
entitled to in Rulon's estate, (R. 337); that Terry's
signing the Dissolution Agreement was dependent upon
Rulon's agreeing to file a gift tax return ( R. 338) ; that
he heard discussion by Terry and Wunderli regarding
the phrase "liabilities to partners" but did not enter this
discussion ( R. 343) .
Rulon was recalled in rebuttal immediately following Schoenhals' testimony and while stating that very
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little was said at the Murray meeting he did not deny
the specifics of Schoenhals' testimony. ( R. 344-350)
Persons are deemed to intend the clear legal and
factual import of the words they use in their contracts.
Rulon had his attorney Wunderli draw the Dissolution Agreement. (R. 348-9) The phrase "liabilities
to partners" used therein was put to both Rulon's C.P.A.,
Mr. Kenneth A. Elwood, and respondents' professional
witness, Mr. Paul D. Tanner, at the trial for definition.
Mr. Elwood and Mr. Tanner have had 10 and 22 years
experience, respectively as certified public accountants.
Mr. Roe called Mr. Elwood as an expert. He presented him as being particularly conversant with partnership accounting. (R. 190, 194, lines 19-25) He testified
upon questioning by Judge Jeppson:
Q.: You used this word "liability" to refer to
debts to third persons, I suppose, and also loans from
partners?
A. : Loans from partners would be included in
liability accounts.
Q.: As a matter of fact, isn't "liability" often used
and broad enough to include an interest of partners with
relation to their capital investments?
A.: No, sir, I don't believe so.
Q. : In common use, do they ever put liabilities to
include the capital without saying "liabilities, plus capital ... just assets and liabilities?
A. : I have trouble following your question. I
would think not.
Q.: You haven't ran (run) into that use of the
word "liability" to include the capital?
A.: No. The capital is not a liability. (R. 195)
(Emphasis added)
Mr. Tanner verified this concept :
Q.: How would you characterize or define "liabilities to partners"?
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A.: Liabilities to partners, if they exist in the form
of a loan, as such, to the partnership, simply show it in
the general liabilities of the balance sheet, as separate
and distinct from the capital account.

Q. :

You almost answered my (next) question:
is a liability to partners the same as his capital account?
A.: No. (R. 233)
When the court caused Title 48-1-37 U.C.A. 1953
to be read to Mr. Elwood with the implication that
that part of the Partnership Act defines capital as a
liability of the partnership, the witness responded he
felt the Act showed the chronological order of payment
rather than a definition contra to his testimony. (R.
199-200)
Tanner testified that there would be no difference
in the "assets" distributable to partners as stated in the
Articles at paragraph 12, and "net assets" distributable
under paragraph 1 of the Dissolution Agreement. That
in each case the phrases referred to capital or net worth.
( R. 23 7-8) Tanner finally testified that this wording
would prevail, in practice, even if one partner had contributed substantially all of the capital, because the
agreement so provided. ( R. 241 )
FINDING NO. 10 (R. 70-71): "That the parties
and particularly . . . Rulon and Terry, intended and
understood that the effect of the agreements whereby
Terry and Flora would receive, upon dissolution, 40%
and 20%, respectively, of the amounts paid into capital
by Rulon as finally adjusted and determined herein, was
that such receipt was by way of gift from Rulon to
Terry and Flora."
Argument here will show the affirmative intent of
the parties in this regard under (A) infra, and will
answer appellant's argument III that this finding "was
not supported by sufficient evidence and was erroneous
as a matter of law" at (B) infra.
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(A) As to the intention of the parties that the
total effect of the agreements was that a gift came into
being, the evidence is certainly not wanting: The unchallenged testimony was that Rulon had done estate
planning, that Holdsworth and Wunderli had counselled
him in this regard, and in the presence of Terry weeks
prior to dissolution. (R. 141-143) Estate planning invariably involves tax considerations. At the scene of the
ending of the partnership we have the two principal
parties, Rulon and Terry, and their lawyers, discussing
all these matters. A dissolution agreement has been
drawn by Wunderli to effect the winding up. ( R. 348-9)
By its terms and the terms of the Articles of Partnership,
which it replaced, Terry and Flora were receiving sixty
and thirty thousand dollars, respectively, of money which
had originated with Rulon. Discussion was had regarding tax treatment of these monies, particularly gift,
as opposed to income tax consideration. ( R. 293-4)
Terry testified that at the Murray meeting it was
decided to sell the motel (paragraph 1 of Dissolution
Agreement, Ex. 2) in the winding up. That his father
then said "he didn't know how much (it was) going to
be sold for, but assuming . . . assuming we sold it for
book value, or in those words, what it was of that day
* * * that there would be approximately $150,000 to
be distributed, and I would receive 40% of that sum,
which would be tax free." (R. 131) (Emphasis added)
Terry further testified he was concerned that the
Internal Revenue would tax his 40% as income, and
"that is what led me to have my attorney Ed Schoenhals
draw up the Supplemental Agreement to show that
this was a gift, tax free." That he discussed the Supplemental Agreement, and he told his father of his concern regarding income tax. That it would be a tax
advantage to his father in getting portions of his estate
transferred without tax. That his father said there was
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no reason to pay the income tax and he was in complete
agreement to sign the Supplemental Agreement for tax
purposes. ( R. 293-4)
On this point Rulon testified that Schoenhals presented the Supplemental Agreement to him, told him
about a $30,000 gift tax exemption in each himself and
his wife, suggested he and his wife give Terry a $60,000
gift, and he then signed the Supplemental Agreement,
stating this gift concept. (R. 34 7) In this connection
reference is again made to Rulon's report to his daughter,
Mrs. Francis, following the Murray meeting: that he
had given $60,000 to Terry and $30,000 to Flora, that
Terry's was part of his inheritance and would be tax free.
(See page 15 supra. also Schoenhals testimony regarding gift discussions of Murray meeting at page 16 supra).
(Emphasis added) .
The foregoing evidence is abundantly persuasive of
the validity of the finding that Rulon and Terry "intended" and "understood" that the "effect" of the agreements was that Terry's and Flora's share came by way
of gift.
(B) The questions as to whether in fact a gift was
made, or when it was made are clearly outside the scope
of the issues here. The writer will not be led off into the
morass where Mr. Roe's will-o' -the-wisps of donative
intent, capacity, delivery and consideration invite him.
The Supplemental Agreement, as this court stated,
does not clearly indicate a present donative intent, but its
wording could not be clearer in declaring that a completed gift had been made prior to its execution.
Mr. Roe's heading at his Argument III, first of all,
wrongly states the finding. He says: "The Court's finding
that amounts awarded to defendants were by way of gift,
is not supported, etc.'' (Emphasis Added)
The court did not award by way of gift. Let us be
clear on this. The court said Rulon and Terry "intended
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and understood that the effect of the agreements" was
that Terry and Flora received by way of gift. This distinction is real and not technical. This is an entirely
different matter than the court making its award on the
theory of gift.
While the parties clearly intended and believed that
a gift had been made it is completely academic in the
affirmance of the judgment whether a gift was made or
not. The judgment does not rise or fall on gift. The total
import of the findings, conclusions and judgment is that
the parties agreed that Rulon was to put up capital,
Terry was to change his life's course and operate the
venture, profits and losses were to be proportionately
taken and borne by the parties, the parties were to receive
interest on their invested capital, and upon dissolution,
net assets or capital was to be distributed in the proportions herein repeatedly stated. These intentions were
expressly written in the Articles, and in the Dissolution
Agreement as amplified by the Supplemental Agreement.
This result is the result of rights and obligations
arising from basic contract law. Ambiguity was originally
thought by this court to obtain in regard to whether
Rulon's money was loan or capital. That ambiguity has
been removed by a scholarly and arduous search on the
part of the trial court.
Evidence of tax talk and of gift talk by the parties
has here been adduced by the writer to show the basic
contract intent, not to show gift intent per se, although
it is clear that a gift had in fact been made as a result
of the operation of all agreements. Rulon agreed to file
a return to implement this concept.
As this court stated in Wood v. Wood, 89 Utah 394,
49 Pac. 2nd 416, 422, the court is impressed with "natural
behavior". What is more natural than for parties to seek,
with the aid of counsel the most favorable tax treatment
in a monetary situation?
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Whether the taxing authorities ultimately impose
income taxes upon Terry and Flora, or whether they
allow the gift tax theory to prevail is of no concern here.
II
THE COURT'S FINDING AND CONCLUSION REGARDING THE DISSOLUTION AGREEMENT OF MARCH 31, 1960, AS TO INTENT AND
ITS BINDING EFFECT ARE SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE AND APPLICABLE LAW.
Two remarkable things about Mr. Roe's assault upon
the Dissolution Agreement are, first, that his law firm
prepared the agreement and urged its execution upon
Terry, ( R. 338) , and secondly, that Mr. Roe himself in
his first appeal herein argued that respondents were
bound by it. ( (c) page 33, appellant's 1st Brief) A
fortiori, if respondents are bound by it as the accepting
offerees of the provisions contained therein, then Rulon
is likewise bound by it as its drafter, its original signatory,
and the offeror of its provisions. So, too, will it be most
strictly construed against him as its drafter. On these two
points the law is so well settled as to require no reference.
A further bar to appellant's attack on this agreement
is that its validity was not in issue at the trial. The pretrial order as it relates to the agreement reads: "The
pleadings herein will determine the issues with the following exceptions and amendments:

***
2. * * *
1.

3. It appears to the court that the issues to be
determined are:
(a) What is the meaning * * * of the dissolution
agreement signed by the parties and acknowledged on
the 31st day of March, 1960, by Rulon R. West?"
(Emphasis Added)
This court has held that where an issue was not
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framed in the pre-trial order, and not raised by introduction of evidence at the trial, it cannot be raised on appeal.
Upton vs. Heiselt et al. 118 Ut. 573, 223 P. 2nd., 428.
Respondents by Answer and Counterclaim had
asserted the operation of the agreement and appellant
had replied it was never executed. Appellant did not
carry this position into the pre-trial and had, indeed,
argued before this Court on first appeal the binding
nature of the Agreement on respondents, and had used
its terms as the basis for his claim that "liabilities to
partners" included Rulon's contributions which should be
returned. This court apparently accepted appellant's
urging of the validity of the agreement upon it, because
in its remand it stated only the document was "ambiguous" and the intent of the parties in executing it
should be determined by the trial court.
Thus, a determination of "intent" in execution, by
the wording of the remand, and "meaning" in the wording of the pre-trial order, were the tasks assigned to the
trial judge. No challenge of invalidity, of improper execution or of incomplete integration was raised.
At trial, Mr. Roe objected to the admission of Ex.
15, Terry's and Flora's copy of the Agreement, signed
by all parties. The court admitted the exhibit. Mr. Roe
made no motion to amend the pre-trial order to raise the
issue of invalidity. Nor did he enlarge his claim beyond
objecting to admission. ( R. 290)
Nor did the trial court find the agreement was valid
or invalid. He found that the "intent of the parties" in
regard to distribution of net assets in the 40, 40 and 20
percentages was expressed at paragraphs 12 and 6 of
the Articles, and at paragraph 1 of the Dissolution Agreement. He also found that the parties did not intend that
the phrase "liabilities to partners" as used in the Dissolution Agreement should include the capital accounts of
the parties which, of course, by definition is that they
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affirmatively intended that capital accounts were not
included in "liabilities to partners." (R. 70)
· The court made no other finding regarding this
Agreement. The court followed the mandate of this Court
and the pre-trial order: he found intent and meaning.
He obviously assumed the agreement was valid (i.e.
integrated or consummated and legal) and sought only
to remove any ambiguity therefrom. This is shown in his
1st Conclusion of Law: "The parties and each of them
are bound by the terms and provisions of . . . the Articles
of Partnership and the Dissolution Agreement, as said
agreements have been interpreted and construed in the
Findings of Fact." This was his assignment. That he
fulfilled it is manifest.
The foregoing should be dispositive of the point.
But to advert briefly, if academically, to Mr. Roe's argument re validity, his challenge seems based chiefly on
Flora's failure to sign the agreement promptly. (Appellant's brief pp 21-22)
Let us be practical here, and adult. Every person in
this case, including the two trial judges, and Mr. Roe,
knows that this grieving woman has at all times been
virtually on the sidelines as to negotiations and participation. Terry and Rulon set up a 20% interest for her
almost without her knowledge, and explained to her what
she was getting in the Articles she was signing. (R. 174-5)
Moreover, she affirmatively consented to be bound
by their decisions in partnership matters:
A. : Well no; he (Rulon) knew . . . I just told him,
I told them both, I said, "whatever you and Terry do in
these matters of money or anything else is okay with me".
(R. 182) (Emphasis added)
First of all there was absolutely no intent proven at
trial that all three parties had to sign. Mr. Roe asserts
that the only "reasonable inference is that none was to be
bound until the dissolution agreement had been executed

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25
by all". This inference comes right out of "Alice in Wonderland", because he produced no word of testimony to
this effect at the trial. Moreover, the actions of the parties,
viz., Rulon and Terry in going forward with the winding
up pursuant to the terms of the agreement, particularly
the intervention of Ray Holmes in the situation as Rulon's
agent, and Flora's assent and acceptance of benefits under
the agreement are eloquent of total intent that Flora's
signature was not necessary to render the agreement
binding.
In this situation, Flora's signature is not required by
law:
17 Am. Jur. 2d, page 408: SIGNATURE, reads:
"In the absence of statute requiring a signature, or an
agreement that the contract shall not be binding until it
is signed, parties may become bound by the terms of the
contract, where their assent is otherwise indicated, such
as by the acceptance of benefits under the contract."
Further: "The fact that one of the parties has signed the
contract does not necessarily require that the other party
should do likewise," citing WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
3rd Ed., para. 90A, and cases, including U.S.F.&G. Co. v.
Reno Electrical Works, 43 Nev. 191, 183 P. 386, where
it was stated: "Parties may adopt a written contract and
thus make it binding as though formally executed by both,
without signing it." (Emphasis Added)
See also Re,d Fish Boat Co. v. Jarvis Press, Inc., 361
S.W. 2d, 588, 1963, stating: "A person may sign contract
and be bound by writing though other party to agreement signifies acceptance only by acts, conduct or acquiescence" and N.L.R.B. v. Local 825 Intern. Union of
Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, 315 F. 2d, 695 (1964):
"A written contract though signed only by one party
binds the other if he accepts it and both act in reliance
on it as a valid contract."
Flora did, in fact, sign. (Ex. 15)
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She also accepted the provisions of the agreement
and the benefits accruing to her thereunder. (R. 23-25)
She was named a defendant in this action upon the theory
she claimed under this and the other documents adversely to Rulon's interests.
The human, practical reasons for her not signing
immediately seem clearly that Rulon and Terry were
making the arrangements for her benefit, and did not in
fact, ask her to sign, (she was not even invited to the
Murray meeting) and that she affirmatively believed she
was part of the dissolution agreement without signing.

Q.: When did you do it? (sign) Was it after this
case was filed?
A. : Oh yes, I guess it was. I don't know just when
it was. I couldn't say just when it was. But I do know
that . . . I do know that . . . as I remember it ... that
before there "vas any signing or anything as far as I was
concerned the gift was given to us." (Flora Desposition)
Mr. Roe argues that since "the agreement is not
necessarily "beneficial" to her (if she really believed herself already entitled to 20% of Rulon's capital), her
assent cannot be presumed" (Appellant's brief p 22) This
is ridiculous. The agreement is highly beneficial to her,
because it ties Rulon more closely than ever to his original
commitment that Flora will receive 20% of the net assets
upon dissolution. This is the husband who for years has
contested money matters with her, has been substantially
estranged from her and with whom she would now,
naturally, seek the most binding arrangements. (R. 151,
300, 301, 320, 321, 323-330)
III

APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT HEREUNDER IS
ANSWERED BY RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT ON
PAGE 18 SUPRA.
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IV

NO ERROR WAS MADE BY THE COURT IN
REFUSING TO GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION
TO AMEND FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND
JUDGMENT.
That the court found the intent of the parties as it
was directed by the remand of this court has been demonstrated herein, particularly at argument I supra.
The requirement of Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, that the court shall find the facts specially
has likewise been met as shown in the entire argument
herein but particularly I supra, and as will be shown
further at VI infra.
The court did not ignore the judgment of the Master's findings herein entered February 27, 1963. He took
particular notice of it in the last paragraph of the judgment and. therein specifically tied the two judgments
together (R. 74) The receiver will have no difficulty
disbursing funds upon termination of the receivership
because it is, by the conclusions and judgment herein,
directed to proceed in conformity with the procedures
enunciated. (R. 72, 74) Dollar amounts are set forth in
the judgment on the Master's findings and in the jud·gment herein appealed from. No difficulty will be experienced by the receiver in arriving at final figures other
than possible slight dollar amounts that can be reconciled
by a modicum of intelligent application.
The argument regarding Terry's salary will be answered fully at IX infra, where it will be shown that
Terry's salary was an expense and not dependent upon
profits as Mr. Roe seems to believe.

v
COSTS WERE PROPERLY AWARDED TO
RESPONDENTS.
Rule 54 (d) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
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that costs "shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party, unless the Court otherwise directs." Appellant's
argument that he prevailed by having a dissolution,
winding up and distribution effected is specious and,
under the facts, forlorn. He sought not a winding up and
distribution per se, but these steps as incidental to his
main goal of getting back all the money he had contributed to the venture. He sought to prevent respondents from having any distributive share. The court gave
them some $69,000 of the $150,000 capital. The respondents are the prevailing parties on the ultimate issue litigated.

VI
THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND JUDGMENT ARE IN FACT THE
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT OF
THE COURT AND ARE CONSISTENT WITH HIS
MINUTE ENTRY AND WITH THE EVIDENCE.
Mr. Roe's assertion that counsel for defendants prepared the findings of fact herein with the implication
that the court signed them with indifference, if not
blindly, is unwarranted.
Judge Jeppson exhibited particular interest in this
case. Prior to trial his attention was called by counsel
to the requirement of this Court in its remand to determine the intent of the parties in executing the three
agreements. He entered actively into the interrogation
of witnesses himself during trial, as the record shows, particularly the accounting witnesses - and in some instances the family witnesses. (R. 195, 225-231) He
prohibited leading questions by counsel and voluntarily
struck questions and answer in such cases where no objection was entered. (R. 336) At the conclusion of the
trial he entertained lengthy argument - two and one
half hours to the side.
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He entered his Minute Entry of Decision on April
21, 1964, four days after the trial closed. His main topic
sentence in the Minute Entry states "The intention of
the parties to the Articles as to the meaning of the Articles requires the following : " thence setting forth the
accounting entry adjustments he had decided were necessary to comport with the evidence and with law.
The wording of the Minute Entry is in traditional
brevity.
The court invited counsel for respondents to prepare
detailed findings and conclusions and himself set conferences with counsel to discuss the wording once it had
been formulated. At least two such conferences were
held with both Mr. Roe and the writer, at which both
Terry and Rulon were present at least once each. The
court indicated at the first conference he had given considerable study to the wording of the findings and
conclusions submitted to him and desired to make several
changes therein. The wording of the findings was then
discussed by the court at length - indeed, even argued
out among counsel and the court. The court struck some
wording, revised other wording and actively indicated
the final wording he would approve.
Prior to the signing of the final judgment and for
about six weeks subsequent to the submission of the draft
of findings to the court by the writer, both counsel worked
on a dollar amount accounting which was stipulated
to as representing the court's legal and accounting theory
in the case and appears in the findings in No. 4.
Subsequent to signing the judgment and upon hearing Mr. Roe's Motion To Amend, the court heard another two hour argument by Mr. Roe and still refused
to adopt his theory of the case.
The writer realizes that both his averments here,
as well as Mr. Roe's regarding this point are outside
the written record, but he submits them in good faith
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in -response to the unfortunate charge that the court
abdicated his responsibility.
ARGUMENT ON CROSS APPEAL
VII
THE· COURT'S FINDING NO. 6, THAT THE
AMOUNTS PAID INTO THE PARTNERSHIP BY
RULON ON AND AFTER DECEMBER 3, 1958,
WERE NOT INTENDED AS CONTRIBUTIONS TO
CAPITAL NOR TO BE DISTRIBUTED PROPORTIONATELY TO PARTNERS UPON DISSOLUTION, IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
AND IS ERRONEOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Rulon paid $119,224.00 into the partnership prior
to December 3, 1958 and $29,645.35 after that date.
(R. 69)
Over respondent's objections that they were selfserving the Court admitted a copy of a letter Rulon
claimed to have sent to Terry on Dec. 3, 1958 and another dated December 10, 1959. These are Exhibits 9
and 10 respectively. Exhibit 9 contains a list of some 29
checks by date and amount representing the payments
made by Rulon into the partnership venture to that date.
The letter recites that Rulon is enclosing a series of notes
as per "our mutual understanding" to bear interest at
5% and to represent his payments theretofore made into
the company. Exhibit 10 is another reference to the
same matter.
It is obvious from the pleadings and the trial record
that Appellant did not claim December 3, 1958 as a
cut-off date when capital contributions changed to loans.
He presented the two exhibits and the testimony regarding them as proving his basic claim that all monies he
had advanced were by way of loan.
The writer believes that Appellant and Mr. Roe
were as surprised as he that the Court deemed Dec. 8,
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1958 as a date when a relationship changed. The letters
themselves make no claim for December 8, as a cut-off
date. Deciding that all monies paid in by Rulon prior
to said date were capital contributions while all monies
paid in thereafter were loans is completely out of context with the pleadings, the weight of the evidence and
the contentions of the parties at all stages of litigation.
"It is improper to make a finding which is not warranted by the pleadings, evidence, or stipulated facts, and
wholly at variance UJith the claims of either party." 89
C.J.S., 462. (Emphasis added)
The decision was .particularly unfounded as to
the evidence.
As to law it is erroneous and cannot stand: ( 1) It
is based solely on self-serving and inadmisable evidence,
and ( 2) it seeks to impose a contract of loan which is
always bilateral, upon the parties by proof only of a
unilateral intent of one party.
As to ( 1 ) : The admission of this type of self-serving
evidence violates the rule against hearsay.
20 Am. Jur. § 558, evidence: "Self-serving declarations: There is a general rule that self-serving
declarations, defined as statements favorable to the
interest of the declarant, are not admissable into evidence
as proof of the facts asserted, whether they arose from
acts and conduct or were made orally or were reduced to
writing. The vital objection to the admission of this kind
of evidence is its hearsay character. Furthermore, such
declarations are untrustworthy; to permit their introduction in evidence would open the door to frauds and
perjuries." (Emp. Added) The notation cites many cases,
including Dempsey v. Dobson, 174 Pa. 122, 34 A. 459,
32 L.R.A. 764, wherein it was held: "An unanswered
letter containing the writer's argumentative presentation
of his view of his rights * * * is a declaration in his own
behalf and inadmissable ~ his favor."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

32

To the same point is the opinion of our court cited
favorably in other jurisdictions that: "The letter from
plaintiff to deceased is purely a self-serving document,
and aside from the effect of the statute (dead man) or
other connecting evidence, was properly rejected by the
trial court." Clayton v. Ogden St.ate Bank, 82 Utah, 564,
26 P2, 545. In Clayton the letter was offered to show
a contract with the deceased and in addition to its being
in violation of the so-called dead-man's statute, it was
inadmissable as self-serving. (Emphasis added)
The cases are legion on the point. In some courts
where there was proof the addressee had received the
letter the tendency is to be less strict on admissability, but,
the great weight is against admissability, and the total
weight seems against admissability where it is just a
carbon of a letter alleged to have been sent with no
independent proof of its having been received.
No independent evidence of receipt was adduced
and Terry categorically denied receiving the two communications or either of them, and denied emphatically
he had discussed loans with his father at any time.
(R. 273)
This court has apparently not more recently than
Clayton, supra, ruled on the point but a well reasoned
opinion in the State of Washington is here commended.
In Conner Co. v. McCollister and Campbell Inc. 115
P.2, 370, we read: "So, if plaintiff is to recover, it must
be on the theory that there was an express agreement on
the part of McCollister and Campbell to pay a commission. The only evidence that there was any such
agreement is contained in appellant's (plaintiffs) letter
of May 3rd, in which it laid claim to a commission. This
letter, of course, was a self-serving declaration and was
inadmissable;" (Emp. Added) citing cases and 2 JONES,
COMMENTARIES ON EVIDENCE (2nd. Ed.), 1636
§ 895 : " * * * I would obviously be unsafe if parties to
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litigation, without restriction, were allowed to support
their claims by proving their own statements made out
of court. Such a practice would be open to all the
objections which exist against the admission of heresay
in general, and would also open the door to fraud and
the fabrication of testimony." (Italics by the Washington
Court.) The court finally ruled that even though the
letter in that case had been admitted without objection,
it should not have been and could possess no probative
value.
But, even if exhibits 9 and 10 were admissable,
taken in the light most favorable to appellant, their
,veight is merely added to the weight of this entire record,
namely that Rulon wanted some interest on the money
he had put into the business. No more, no less.
The courts' decision that these two letters effected
a cut-off date as between capital and loan is completely
unfounded. This thought didn't even enter Rulon's mind.
If he ever wrote such letters he was saying he wanted
interest. In court he is now asking these self-serving letter
copies to create a loan situation, not as of December 8,
1958, but as of October 15, 1957, the date the venture
was born.
In order to have made this cut-off, the trial court
must have believed that December 3rd was the first time
Rulon had expressed his intent to his partners that he
considered his payments as loans. If this be so, and it is
the only plausible conclusion, then by definition the court
must have believed that all talk and expressed intent
theretofore sounded in capital, distributable, not loans.
(2) That a loan is a bilateral contract arising from
the mutual consent of two or more parties, and cannot be
created by a unilateral intent or notion of one is so basic
in law as to require no recitation of case or text law here.
The finding should be changed to show all monies
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contributed by Rulon, before and after December 3,
1958 were paid in as capital and not as loans.

VIII
THE COURT'S FINDING (NO. 3) THAT
INTEREST ON A PARTNER'S CAPITAL ACCOUNT NOT PAID IN A GIVEN YEAR SHOULD
BE CREDITED TO A LIABILITY ACCOUNT OF
THE PARTNERSHIP, PAYABLE TO THE PARTNER, AND SHOULD NOT BE CREDITED TO HIS
CAPITAL ACCOUNT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE, IS COUNTER TO GENERALLY
ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND IS
ERRONEOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW.
In partnership accounting practice payment to a
partner of annual interest on his capital account is a
standard method of distributing profits.

MASON, FUNDAMENTALS OF ACCOUNTING, 2nd Ed. p 151 reads: "Frequently, however, the
method of distribution (profits) will attempt to make
allowances for differences in the positions of the partners
as to such matters as Capital investment or time contributed to partnership affairs. An "interest allowance"
is often used to reflect the difference in capital investment; a designated percentage is applied to the balances
of the capital accounts at the beginning of the period or
to the average capital investment for the period and the
results constitute a preliminary distribution of a portion
of the net income." (Emphasis added)
Accountant Tanner was asked if this were common
practice, and he answered :
"A. It is quite common; frequently a situation
where partners will provide in the distribution of profits,
one of the facts to be considered in the distribution of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35
profits in the matter of interest on capital accounts."
(R. 219) (Emphasis Added)

* * * *

"0. You said this type of interest (payment) is
""'

clearly a distribution of profits; is that a fair statement?
A. It is in the absence of any agreement to the
contrary - it is considered a distribution of profits.''
(R. 223)
Paragraph 4 of the Articles providing for the payment of 5% interest to partners on capital accounts out
of gross profits and providing that the interest should
be cumulative was read to him. When asked how a
partner would be paid his interest payment under such
contract terms he replied :
"A. Paid directly at the time, or credited to his
capital account, subject to drawings from time to time."
Q. And - we are again talking about that interest
being considered, accounting wise, as a distribution of
profits to him; is that correct?
A. Yes. (R. 229) (Emphasis Added)
The Court challenged Mr. Tanner's opinion that
interest if not paid to the partner, should be credited
to his capital account. The record from page 224 to page
231 reflects what the writer believes to be the Court's
opinion that such interest should be carried in a liability
account of the partnership payable to the partner, rather
than in the partner's capital account. The Court so held
in the finding, even though these pages will show the
Court did not move Mr. Tanner from his opinion. We
submit Mr. Tanner's is the correct position.
The Court and Mr. Tanner were at variance as to
what should be done about interest on partners capital
accounts in years where the partnership made no profit
from which to pay the interest. The Court argued that
interest being "cumulative" would have to be carried
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in a contingent liability account, but Mr .Tanner consistently argued that it should not, that since the payment
of such interest was a distribution of profits, in the years
no profits were made, no interest was earned by the
partner. That this did not affect its cumulative aspect:
In years when profits were made interest for the current
as well as past years would be paid from profits. (R.
224-231)
That Mr. Tanner persuaded the Court on this point
is evident from the absence of any "contingent liability"
finding.
The intent of the parties regarding interest payments as written in paragraph 4 of the Articles is shown
to co-incide with Mr. Tanner's delineation:
Mr. Roe asked Terry if there was any discussion
with Rulon about payment of interest, at the time the
partnership was being formed. Terry answered:
"I think I answered it; answer again - he said
that, where he was contributing most of the capital out
there - actually all of it except for a few dollars that he would expect, upon a distribution of profits,
before I would get 40%, that the first step would be to
give him a 5 per cent - or anybody a 5% interest on
the capital balance, first; and then, the remainder would
be distributed 40, 40, 20 under distribution of profits
(par. 6, Articles). I said it was allright with me." (R.
112-113) Rulon did not deny this talk. (Emphasis added)
Terry testified also under Mr. Roe's questioning that
all interest payments to partners were in fact credited to
the capital accounts. That Rulon had been paid some
$6,000 is reflected in the partnership income tax returns
exhibits 4, 5, 6 & 7. (R. 137-138)
The finding and judgment should be reversed, and
ordered that in the accounting, interest when not paid
to a partner should be credited to his capital account;

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

37
not to a liability account of the partnership, payable to
the partner.

IX
THE COURT'S FINDING (NO. 3) THAT IN
THE CALCULATION OF "GROSS PROFITS"
SALARIES TO PARTNERS SHOULD NOT BE
DEDUCTED FROM GROSS SALES OR INCOME
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND
IS ERRONEOUS IN LAW.
Article 5 reads: "The said Terry West shall be the
manager of the partnership business and shall be entitled
to draw up to but not exceeding the sum of $500 per
month for his services, all amounts so drawn to be
charged as a partnership expense and deducted before
any division of net profits is made." (Emphasis added)
This unambiguous wording clearly shows the intent
of the partners in drafting the original Articles to be
that Terry's salary was an expense item and not a
distribution of profit to him.
No evidence was adduced to establish another
interpretation.
The Court asked Mr. Tanner if in the or,dinary
partnership salary to a partner would be something deducted from income in order to determine profits. Mr.
Tanner replied that unless otherwise agreed upon salaries
to partners would be a distribution of profit rather than
an expense item. (R. 247) This is the only testimony
the writer can find on which the Court could have
based his finding that salary to a partner should not be
deducted as an expense in determining profit. It is clearly
erroneous because here we have the clear wording of
the parties showing they had "otherwise agreed", to use
Tanner's words.
The finding should be reversed, and the accounting
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ordered to reflect Terry's salary as an expense item to
be substracted from partnership receipts in calculating
profits.
CONCLUSION
This Court on remand was concerned about the intent of the parties in executing contract documents measured against a background of their relationship to each
other, "the purposes for which the documents were made,
and principles of justice and equity relating thereto."
The evidence has clearly shown a wealthy husband and
father approaching an age when prudence dictated getting property out of his estate into the hands of members
of his family, in this instance his wife and son. His agreement was generous, but in view of the personal relationship it is not offensive to equity to interpret his commitment as the trial court has done.
Moreover, as to Terry at least, with whom Rulon
chiefly bargained, there was full contractual consideratiop for Rulon's promises. Terry changed his life's work,
terminated graduate work in college, gave full time to
management of the venture, and received only a nominal
wage from the partnership for three years in exchange for
his father's promise that upon a business termination he
would receive 40% of his father's contributions. Terry
was promised a $500.00 salary but in fact drew less than
25% of this amount. Equity is clearly not offended here.
As to law, Rulon's commitments to Terry and Flora
were plainly delineated in the agreements, which in the
light of the evidence are not ambiguous. He agreed with
them at paragraph 3 of the Articles that his contributions were by way of capital, and he agreed at paragraphs 12 and 6 that upon dissolution his son and wife
would get 60% of the assets which he had committed,
after the obligations were paid. He consented anew to this
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result in the unambiguous provisions of the Dissolution
Agreement at a time when, if he had had any change
of heart, he would have then declared it. Lastly, he affirmed again this specific intent and consent in an agreement Supplemental to the Dissolution contract.
Appellant would not, as he says in his conclusion,
like a remand to the trial Judge to "himself" prepare
the findings based on his impression of the evidence for
the simple reason the trial Judge would find as he already has, except perhaps to vacate his finding on the
December 3rd cut off date and allocate the $30,000.00
contributed by Rulon after that date to capital as the evidence shows it should be.
Neither the Receiver, the parties nor the Judiciary
will experience any real difficulty in making dollar amount
calculations and disbursements based on the present state
of the record, nor as it will stand after this court orders
reversal on the three points argued by respondents at VII,
VIII and IX herein.
Respectfully submitted,

CHRISTIAN RONNOW
Mabey, Ronnow, Madsen & Marsden
574 East Second South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendants,
Respondents and Cross-Appellants.
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APPENDIX "A"
ARTICLES OF PARTNERSHIP
This AGREEMENT, made and entered into as of the 15th
day of October, A.D. 1957, by RULON R. WEST, TERRY R.
WEST and FLORA E. WEST,-WITNESSETH:
That the above named parties have associated themselves as
partners under the firm name of EL RANCHO ENTERPRISES
for the purposes and on the conditions herein recited.:
1. The partnership business shall be that of operating motels,
auto camps, trailer camps, tourst camps and allied businesses and
shall be carried on at 5203 South State Street, in Murray City, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, or at such other place or places as the
partners may from time to time agree upon.
2. Said partnership shall continue until dissolved by the
mutual consent of the partners or terminated by operation of law.
3. The capital of the partnership shall consist of the following
property:
(a) A real estate contract covering the purchase by the partnership and the sale by Reed P. Mortensen and Ann S. Mortensen,
his wife, of the Murray El Rancho Motel, including approximately
four (4) acres of real property situated at 5203 South State Street,
in Murray City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, including the
personal property located in the sixteen motel units situated upon
said real property upon which contract the said Rulon R. West
has paid the sum of $47,500.00 and the sum of $1,000.00 cash in
bank account also furnished by the said Rulon R. West.
(b) Any further sums which any partner shall with the consent of the other from time to time contribute for capital purposes
which shall be credited to his caiptal account.
4. Interest at the rate of five per cent (5%) per annum shall
be paid to each partner on the capital for the time being standing
to his credit out of the gross profits of the business, and such interest shall be cumulative, so that any deficiency in one year shall
be made up out of the gross profits of any succeeding year or years.
5. The said Terry R. West shall be the manager of the partnership business and shall be entitled to draw up to but not exceeding
the sum of $500.00 per month for his services, all amounts so
drawn to be charged as a partnership expense and deducted before
any division of net profits is made.
6. The net profits of the business shall be divided between the
partners in the following proportions: Rulon R. West, forty per cent
(40%) ; Terry R. West, forty per cent ( 40%) and Flora E. West
twenty per cent ( 20% ) ; and the partners shall in like proportion
bear all losses, including loss of capital.
7. The usual books of account shall be kept properly posted
up, and shall not be removed from the place of business without
the consent of all partners. Each partner shall have free access to
them at ail times, and shall be at liberty to make such extracts
therefrom as he may think fit.
v
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8. On the .15th day of Oc:tober, A.D. _1958 and on the 15th
day of Octob~r In each succeeding year dunng the continuation of
the p~rt?7~ship, an ac~ount s~all be taken of all the capital, assets
and habllitles ~or the time being of the partnership, and a balance
s~e~t and profit and l~ss account making due allowance for dept-eCiatlon and for recouping any lost capital shall be prepared and a
copy theerof furnished to each partner. t any time agreed upon by
all of the partners, after the preparation of the said balance sheet
and profit and los~ ~ccou?t, the net pr<:>fits, if any, shown by such
account may be divided In the proportions set forth in paragraph
6 above hereof.
9. The partners agree: (a) That Terry R. West shall diligently attend to the business and devote such portion of his time
the:eto as is necessary to properly and economically operate said
busu1:ess. (b ~ each partner shall punctually pay his separate debts
and Indemnify the other partners and the asset of the partnership
against the same and all expenses on account thereof; (c) each
partner shall forthwith pay all moneys, checks, and negotiable instruments received by him on account of the firm into the bank
or banks selected by the partners to the firm account; (d) each
partner shall be just and faithful to the other partners, and at all
times give to such other partners full information and truthful
explanations of all matters relating to the affairs of the partnership,
and afford every assistance in his power in carrying on the business
for their mutual advantage.
10. No partner shall without the consent of the others (a)
Lend any of the moneys or deliver upon credit any of the goods of
the firm to any person or persons whom the other partners shall
have previously in writing forbidden him to trust; (b) Give any
security or promise for the payment of money on account of the
firm unless in the ordinary course of business; (c) enter into any
bond, or become bail, indorser or surety for any person, or knowingly cause or suffer to be done anything whereby the partnership
property may be seized, attached, or taken on execution or endangered; (d) assign, mortgage, or charge hi share in the assets or
profits of teh partnership, or any part of such shae; (e) draw,
accept, or indorse any bill of exchange or promissory note on
account of the firm; (f) sign any check on behalf of the firm for
a sum exceeding $500.00; (g) buy, order, or contract for any goods
or property exceeding the value of $500.00 on behalf of the partnership; (h) compromise, or compound, or, except upon 'Payment
in full, release or discharge any debt due to the partnership.
11. If any partner shall die during the continuance of the said
partnership, the survivors or survivor may puchase the _share of the
deceased partner in the capital and assets of the business on the
following terms: (a) The purchase price shall be the atr_lount at
which such share shall stand in the last balance sheet which shall
have been prepared prior to the death of said partner plus ten ~r
cent ( 10%) thereof; (b) such purchase of any deceased partners
interest, if made by the surviving partners or partner, shall be
vi
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effected within one year from the date of death, and in addition
to the purchase money, the surviving partners or partner shall pay
a sum equal to interest on the amount of said purchase price computed from the date of the then last preceding annual account up
to the date of death of the deceased at the rate of 5% per annum
in lieu both of interest on capital, including any arrears of such
interest for preceeding years, and profits during such period, credit
being given for any sums drawn out by the deceased partner during
the then current year.
12. If the surviving partners or partner shall not exercise the
option of purchasing the share and interest of the deceased partner,
or if the partnership shall be determined or expire during the joint
lives of the partners, then the partnership shall be wound up, and
the assets distributed in the proportions set forth in paragraph 6
above hereof.
13. All rents, taxes, cost of repairs, alterations, or improvements, insurance and all other costs, charges and expenses which
shall be incurred in or about the business or in any wise relating
thereto, and all losses which shall happen in respect to the business,
shall be paid out of the income or capital of the partnership, and
in case of any deficiency thereof by the partners in the proportions
set forth in paragraph 6 above hereof.
14. Notwithstanding the death of any partner, the partnership between the surviving partners shall continue under these
articles of partnership.
15. At the end or sooner determination of the partnership
the partners, each to the other, shall make a true, just and final
account of all things relating to their said business, and in all things
ad just the same; and all stock, as well as the gains and increases
thereof, including all real and peronal property, which shall
appear to be remaining, either in money, goods, wares, fixtures,
debts or otherwise shall be divided between them in the proportions set forth in paragraph 6 above hereof.
16. Any decisions and major arrangements required or necessary in the operation of said business which are not in the ordinary
course of operations shall only be made and effected by and with
the unanimous agreement and consent of all the partners.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the partners above named have
hereunto set their hands and seals the day and year first above
written.
/s/ Rulon R. West
/s/ Terry R. West
/s/ Flora West
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
STATE OF UTAH

~ ss

On the 1st day of October, A.D. 195 7 personally appeared
before me the said Rulon R. West, Terry R. West and Flora E.
West, signers of the above instrument, who duly severally acknowlvii
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edged to me that they executed the same.
(Seal)
My Commission Expires:
Sept. 10, 1959
Paul S. Roberts
. .
Notary Public
Residing at Murray City, Utah
APPENDIX "B"
AGREEMENT made this........ day of................................ 1960
by and between RULON R. WEST, FLORA E. WEST and
TERRY R. WEST.
'
WHEREAS, the parties hereto are partners under those certain Articles of Partnership dated the 15th day of October 1957
and
'
'
WHEREAS, said partnership has been and is hereby declared
to be dissolved, and
. WHEREAS, the. parties hereto d~s~re to make an agreement
with respect to certain matters pertaining to the winding up of
the partnership affairs,
NOW, THEREFORE, the part~es hereto agree that Rulon
R. West and Terry R. West shall have authority to wind up the
partnership affairs, shall concur in all matters pertaining to the
winding up of the partnership affairs, and shall proceed to wind
up_ the partnership affairs in accordance with the following proVISions:
1. Elements and Completion of Winding Up. The winding up
of the partnership affairs shall consist of selling all real and personal property of the partnership, paying all partnership liabilities
(including liabilities to partners), and distributing the net assets of
the partnership in cash to the parties hereto in the following
proportions:
Rulon R. West
40%
Terry R. West
40%
Flora E. West
20%
When all the net assets of the partnership have been distributed
in cash in accordance with the preceding sentence, the winding up
of the partnership affairs shall be completed.
2. Operation of Partnership Business Pending Sale. Each
business of the partnership shall be operated until such time as
such business is sold. Rulon R. Wet and Terry R. West and Flora
West shall concur in all management decisions pertaining to the
operation of said businesses. Terry R. West shall diligently att~nd
to the business in the daily operation of the businesses, wh~ch
operation shall include the renting of ~cco~odation~, th~ maintenance of all partnership property, Including the Inte:Ior and
exterior of all buildings, rental units, signs, fences, sidewal~,
driveways and other real and personal property of the partnersh!p,
in gooo depair, working order and appearan~e, a~d th~ maintenance of the motel and trailer camp premises, Including _the
lawn, shrubbery and trees, in a state of good, neat and attracitve
viii
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apperance, having such assitance as is reasonably necessary to
accomplish same. Terry R. West shall receive reasonable and
periodic compensati~n for his. services per~ining to the daily
operation of the businesses, whtch compensation shall be on the
same basis as heretofore taken and no additional compensation
unless said compensation is agreed upon from [time] to time by
all of the parties hereto.
3. Receipts and Disbursements. All receipts obtained from
operations of the motel, trailer sales, and trailer park shall be
deposited in the usual account and checked out only for payment
of employees salaries, utiilties, and ordinary expenses, including
expenses to Terry R. West as above specified. All receipts involving sales of capital assets or realization from trailer sales where
equities aside from the obligation and any other capital assets
sales shall be placed in a special bank account, from which no
proceeds can be taken except over the signatures of Terry R. West
and Rulon R. West, or instead of Rulon R. West, Leroy E.
Holmes.
4. Sale of Partnership Property. All partnership property,
including the good will, shall be sold as soon and for a price as
near to the fair market value thereof as is reasonably possible
under the circumstances. Any offer for the purchase of any part
or all of the partnership property which is made by a reasonbly
dependable and solvent offeror, on reasonable terms and for a
reasonable amount shall be accepted. No property shall be accepted in trade as either part or full payment for the purchase
of part or all of the partnership propety unless such property can
be expected to be sold with reasonable promptness at a price equal
or in excess of the value for which it-- was accepted in trade.
The sale of the partnership property shall be advertised in a
reasonable manner, consistent with the desires to make a sale with
reasonable promptness and to attract the attention of as many as
possible of those persons who would and could qualify as purchasers.
5. Distribution of Partnership Assets. The parties hereto shall
determine from time to time during the period of the winding up
of the partnership affairs the amount of the partnership assets
which may be distributed to the perties hereto in cash in the
~roportions specified in Paragraph 1 hereof, taking into consideration the absolute and contingent liabilities of the partnership.
6. Statements. On or before the 3rd day of April, 1960, and
each six (6) months thereafter until the winding up of the
partnersihp affairs is completed, Terry R. West shall prepare and
shall distribute to each of the parties hereto an accurate, detailed
and complete statement of all partnership assets, liabilities, receipts and disbursements. The partnership books hall be kept
current by Terry R. West. Each of the parties shall have access
to the partnerhip books at any reasonable time.
7. Authority of Leroy E. Holmes. At all times during which
Rulon R. West is away from Salt Lake City, Utah, during the
ix
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period of the winding up of t~e partnership affairs, Leroy E.
Holmes, of 1381 Brookshire Dnve, Salt Lake City Utah shall
so long as he is in possession of a written and effedtive po'wer of
attorney from Rulon R. West, have the right to act for and in
behalf of Rulon R. yYest i~ all matters pertaining to the winding
up of .t~e partne~ship affaus, and shall have the rights, powers
and pnvtleges which Rulon R. West has under this agreement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have hereunto
subscribed their names the day and year above written.
/s/ Rulon R. West
/s/ Flora West
/s/ Terry R. West
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
STATE OF UTAH
On the 31st day of March, 1960, personally appeared before
me RULON R. WEST, one of the signers of the within and
foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.
Jane Roberts
Notary Public
Residing at Salt Lake County, Utah
My commission expires:
April 9, 1961
APPENDIX "C''
AGREEMENT
This supplemental agreement to the dissolution agreement
made and entered into the 2nd day of April, 1960, wherein it
is mutually agreed as follows:
1. The contribution made by Rulon R. West with respect
to the 40 per cent interest acquired by Terry R. West was and
is a gift from Rulon R. West to Terry R. West, and Rulon R.
West does agree to file a gift tax return in connection therewith
so stating.
2. Should the motel or the businesses be sold at a loss
wherein the net recoveries are less than the sums due thereon,
all loss will be absorbed and paid by Rulon R. West.
3. The undersigned, Rulon R. West, further certifies. that
the interest in the El Rancho Enterprises was not only a gift to
Terry R. West, but also to Flora West and their interests were
acquired by virtue of the gift.
.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 2nd day of April, 1960.
/s/ Rulon R. West
/s/ Terry R. West
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